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Abstract
Starting from a generalization of the standard axioms for a monoid we present a step-
wise development of various, mutually equivalent foundational axiom systems for category
theory. Our axiom sets have been formalized in the Isabelle/HOL interactive proof as-
sistant, and this formalization utilizes a semantically correct embedding of free logic in
classical higher-order logic. The modeling and formal analysis of our axiom sets has been
significantly supported by series of experiments with automated reasoning tools integrated
with Isabelle/HOL. We also address the relation of our axiom systems to alternative pro-
posals from the literature, including an axiom set proposed by Freyd and Scedrov for
which we reveal a technical issue (when encoded in free logic): either all operations, e.g.
morphism composition, are total or their axiom system is inconsistent. The repair for this
problem is quite straightforward, however.
1 Introduction
We present a stepwise development of axiom systems for category theory by generalizing the
standard axioms for a monoid to a partial composition operation. Our purpose is not to make
or claim any contribution to category theory but rather to show how formalizations involving
the kind of logic required (free logic) can be validated within modern proof assistants.
A total of eight different axiom systems is studied. The systems I-VI are shown to be equiva-
lent. The axiom system VII slightly modifies axiom system VI to obtain (modulo notational
transformation) the set of axioms as proposed by Freyd and Scedrov in their textbook “Cat-
egories, Allegories” [10], published in 1990; see also Subsection 9.2 where we present their
original system. While the axiom systems I-VI are shown to be consistent, a constricted
inconsistency result is obtained for system VII (when encoded in free logic where free vari-
ables range over all objects): We can prove (∃ x . ¬(E x )) → False, where E is the existence
predicate. Read this as: If there are undefined objects, e.g. the value of an undefined com-
position x ·y, then we have falsity. By contraposition, all objects (and thus all compositions)
must exist. But when we assume the latter, then the axiom system VII essentially reduces
categories to monoids. We note that axiom system V, which avoids this problem, corresponds
to a set of axioms proposed by Scott [15] in the 1970s. The problem can also be avoided
by restricting the variables in axiom system VII to range only over existing objects and by
postulating strictness conditions. This gives us axiom system VIII.
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Our exploration has been significantly supported by series of experiments in which automated
reasoning tools have been called from within the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL [12] via the
Sledgehammer tool [4]. Moreover, we have obtained very useful feedback at various stages
from the model finder Nitpick [5] saving us from making several mistakes.
At the conceptual level this paper exemplifies a new style of explorative mathematics which
rests on a significant amount of human-machine interaction with integrated interactive-auto-
mated theorem proving technology. The experiments we have conducted are such that the
required reasoning is often too tedious and time-consuming for humans to be carried out
repeatedly with highest level of precision. It is here where cycles of formalization and ex-
perimentation efforts in Isabelle/HOL provided significant support. Moreover, the technical
inconsistency issue for axiom system VII was discovered by automated theorem provers, which
further emphasises the added value of automated theorem proving in this area.
To enable our experiments we have exploited an embedding of free logic [14] in classical
higher-order logic, which we have recently presented in a related paper [1].
We also want to emphasize that this paper has been written entirely within the Isabelle
framework by utilizing the Isabelle “build” tool; cf. [16], Section 2. It is thus an example
of a formally verified mathematical document, where the PDF document as presented here
has been generated directly from the verified source files mentioned above. We also note that
once the proofs have been mechanically checked, they are generally easy to find by hand using
paper and pencil.
2 Embedding of Free Logic in HOL
Free logic models partial functions as total functions over a “raw domain” D. A subset E of
D is used to characterize the subdomain of “existing” objects; cf. [14] for further details.
The experiments presented in the subsequent sections exploit our embedding of free logic in
HOL [1]. This embedding is trivial for the standard Boolean connectives. The interesting
aspect is that free logic quantifiers are guarded in the embedding by an explicit existence
predicate E (associated with the subdomain E of D), so that quantified variables range only
over existing objects, while free variables and arbitrary terms may also denote undefined/non-
existing objects outside of E. This way we obtain an elegant treatment of partiality resp.
undefinednes as required in category theory. In our related paper [1] we also show how
definite description can be appropriately modeled in this approach. However, the definite
description is not required for purposes of this paper, so we omit it. Note that the connectives
and quantifiers of free logic are displayed below in bold-face fonts. Normal, non-bold-face
connectives and quantifiers in contrast belong to the meta-logic HOL. The prefix “f”, e.g. in
fNot, stands for “free”.
typedecl i — Type for individuals
consts fExistence:: i⇒bool (E ) — Existence/definedness predicate in free logic
abbreviation fNot (¬) — Free negation
where ¬ϕ ≡ ¬ϕ
abbreviation fImplies (infixr → 13 ) — Free implication
where ϕ → ψ ≡ ϕ −→ ψ
abbreviation fIdentity (infixr = 13 ) — Free identity
where l = r ≡ l = r
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abbreviation fForall (∀ ) — Free universal quantification guarded by existence predicate E
where ∀Φ ≡ ∀ x . E x −→ Φ x
abbreviation fForallBinder (binder ∀ [8 ] 9 ) — Binder notation
where ∀ x . ϕ x ≡ ∀ϕ
Further free logic connectives can now be defined as usual.
abbreviation fOr (infixr ∨ 11 )
where ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ (¬ϕ) → ψ
abbreviation fAnd (infixr ∧ 12 )
where ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
abbreviation fImplied (infixr ← 13 )
where ϕ ← ψ ≡ ψ → ϕ
abbreviation fEquiv (infixr ↔ 15 )
where ϕ ↔ ψ ≡ (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
abbreviation fExists (∃ )
where ∃Φ ≡ ¬(∀ (λy. ¬(Φ y)))
abbreviation fExistsBinder (binder ∃ [8 ]9 )
where ∃ x . ϕ x ≡ ∃ϕ
In this framework partial and total functions are modelled as follows: A function f is total if
and only if for all x we have E x→ E (f x ). For partial functions f we may have some x such
that E x but not E (f x ). A function f is strict if and only if for all x we have E (f x ) → E x.
3 Preliminaries
Morphisms in the category are objects of type i. We introduce three partial functions, dom
(domain), cod (codomain), and · (morphism composition). Partiality of composition is han-
dled exactly as expected: we generally may have non-existing compositions x ·y (i.e.¬(E (x ·y)))
for some existing morphisms x and y (i.e. E x and E y).
consts
domain:: i⇒i (dom - [108 ] 109 )
codomain:: i⇒i (cod - [110 ] 111 )
composition:: i⇒i⇒i (infix · 110 )
For composition · we assume set-theoretical composition here (i.e., functional composition
from right to left). This means that
(cod x )·(x ·(dom x )) ∼= x
and that
(x ·y)a ∼= x (y a) when dom x ≃ cod y
The equality symbol ∼= denotes Kleene equality and it is defined as follows (where = is identity
on all objects, existing or non-existing, of type i):
abbreviation KlEq (infixr ∼= 56 ) — Kleene equality
where x ∼= y ≡ (E x ∨ E y) → x = y
Reasoning tools in Isabelle quickly confirm that ∼= is an equivalence relation. But existing
identity ≃, in contrast, is only symmetric and transitive, and lacks reflexivity. It is defined
as:
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abbreviation ExId (infixr ≃ 56 ) — Existing identity
where x ≃ y ≡ E x ∧ E y ∧ x = y
We have:
lemma x ∼= x ∧ (x ∼= y → y ∼= x ) ∧ ((x ∼= y ∧ y ∼= z ) → x ∼= z )
by blast
lemma x ≃ x — This does not hold; Nitpick finds a countermodel.1
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma (x ≃ y → y ≃ x ) ∧ ((x ≃ y ∧ y ≃ z ) → x ≃ z )
by blast
lemma x ≃ y → x ∼= y
by simp
lemma x ≃ y ← x ∼= y — Nitpick finds a countermodel
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
Next, we define the identity morphism predicate I as follows:
abbreviation I where I i ≡ (∀ x . E (i ·x ) → i ·x ∼= x ) ∧ (∀ x . E (x ·i) → x ·i ∼= x )
This definition was suggested by an exercise in [10] on p. 4. In earlier experiments we used
a longer definition which can be proved equivalent on the basis of the other axioms. For
monoids, where composition is total, I i means i is a two-sided identity and such are unique.
For categories the property is much weaker.
4 Axiom Set I
Axiom Set I is our most basic axiom set for category theory generalizing the axioms for a
monoid to a partial composition operation. Remember that a monoid is an algebraic structure
(S, ◦), where ◦ is a binary operator on set S, satisfying the following properties:
Closure: ∀a, b ∈ S. a ◦ b ∈ S
Associativity: ∀a, b, c ∈ S. a ◦ (b ◦ c) = (a ◦ b) ◦ c
Identity: ∃idS ∈ S.∀a ∈ S. idS ◦ a = a = a ◦ idS
That is, a monoid is a semigroup with a two-sided identity element.
Our first axiom set for category theory employs a partial, strict binary composition operation
·, and the existence of left and right identity elements is addressed in the last two axioms.
The notions of dom (Domain) and cod (Codomain) abstract from their common meaning in
the context of sets. In category theory we work with just a single type of objects (the type i
of morphisms) and therefore identity morphisms are employed to suitably characterize their
meanings.
S i: — Strictness: E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y) and
E i: — Existence: E (x ·y) ← (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y)) and
Ai: — Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z and
C i: — Codomain: ∀ y.∃ i . I i ∧ i ·y ∼= y and
D i: — Domain: ∀ x .∃ j . I j ∧ x ·j ∼= x
Nitpick confirms that this axiom set is consistent.
1The keyword “oops” in Isabelle/HOL indicates a failed/incomplete proof attempt; the respective (invalid)
conjecture is then not made available for further use. The simplest countermodel for the conjecture given here
consists of single, non-existing element.
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lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
Even if we assume there are non-existing objects we get consistency (which is e.g. not the
case for Axiom Set VII below).
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model2
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
We may also assume an existing and a non-existing object and still get consistency.
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
The left-to-right direction of existence axiom E i is implied.
lemma E iImplied : E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y))
by (metis Ai C i S i)
We can prove that the i in axiom C i is unique. The proofs can be found automatically by
Sledgehammer.3
lemma UC i: ∀ y.∃ i . I i ∧ i ·y ∼= y ∧ (∀ j .(I j ∧ j ·y ∼= y) → i ∼= j )
by (smt Ai C i S i)
Analogously, the provers quickly show that j in axiom D is unique.
lemma UD i: ∀ x .∃ j . I j ∧ x ·j ∼= x ∧ (∀ i .(I i ∧ x ·i ∼= x ) → j ∼= i)
by (smt Ai D i S i)
However, the i and j need not be equal. Using the Skolem function symbols C and D this
can be encoded in our formalization as follows:
lemma (∃C D . (∀ y. I (C y) ∧ (C y)·y ∼= y) ∧ (∀ x . I (D x ) ∧ x ·(D x ) ∼= x ) ∧ ¬(D = C ))
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops — Nitpick finds a
model.
Nitpick finds a model for cardinality i = 2. This model consists of two non-existing objects
i1 and i2. C maps both i1 and i2 to i2. D maps i1 to i2, and vice versa. The composition
i2·i2 is mapped to i2. All other composition pairs are mapped to i1.
Even if we require at least one existing object Nitpick still finds a model:
lemma (∃ x . E x ) ∧ (∃C D . (∀ y. I (C y) ∧ (C y)·y ∼= y) ∧ (∀ x . I (D x ) ∧ x ·(D x ) ∼= x ) ∧ ¬(D
= C ))
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops — Nitpick finds a
model.
Again the model is of cardinality i = 2, but now we have a non-existing i1 and and an existing
i2. Composition · and C are as above, but D is now identity on all objects.
2To display the models or countermodels from Nitpick in the Isabelle/HOL system interface simply put the
mouse on the expression ”nitpick”.
3In our initial experiments proof reconstruction of the external ATP proofs failed in Isabelle/HOL. The
SMT reasoner Z3 [7], which is employed in the smt tactic by default, was too weak. Therefore we first
introduced further lemmata, which helped. However, an alternative way out, which we discovered later, has
been to replace Z3 by CVC4 [8] in Isabelle’s smt tactic (this can be done by stating “declare [[ smt-solver =
cvc4 ]]” in the source document). In the latest version of the proof document we now suitably switch between
the two SMT solvers to obtain best results.
5
5 Axiom Set II
Axiom Set II is developed from Axiom Set I by Skolemization of i and j in axioms C i and
D i. We can argue semantically that every model of Axiom Set I has such functions. Hence,
we get a conservative extension of Axiom Set I. This could be done for any theory with an
“∀ x .∃ i .”-axiom. The strictness axiom S is extended, so that strictness is now also postulated
for the new Skolem functions dom and cod. Note: the values of Skolem functions outside E
can just be given by the identity function.
S ii: — Strictness: (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y) and
E ii: — Existence: E (x ·y) ← (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y)) and
Aii: — Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z and
C ii: — Codomain: E y → (I (cod y) ∧ (cod y)·y ∼= y) and
D ii: — Domain: E x → (I (dom x ) ∧ x ·(dom x ) ∼= x )
As above, we first check for consistency.
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
The left-to-right direction of existence axiom E ii is implied.
lemma E iiImplied : E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y))
by (metis Aii C ii S ii)
Axioms C ii and D ii, together with S ii, show that dom and cod are total functions – as
intended.
lemma domTotal : E x → E (dom x )
by (metis D ii S ii)
lemma codTotal : E x → E (cod x )
by (metis C ii S ii)
Axiom Set II implies Axiom Set I.4
lemma S iFromII : E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)
using S ii by blast
lemma E iFromII : E (x ·y) ← (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y))
using E ii by blast
lemma AiFromII : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using Aii by blast
lemma C iFromII : ∀ y.∃ i . I i ∧ i ·y ∼= y
by (metis C ii S ii)
lemma D iFromII : ∀ x .∃ j . I j ∧ x ·j ∼= x
by (metis D ii S ii)
4Axiom Set I also implies Axiom Set II. This can be shown by semantical means on the meta-level. We
have also attempted to prove this equivalence within Isabelle/HOL, but so far without final success. However,
we succeed to prove that the following holds: ∃Cod Dom. ((∀ x y . (E (x ·y)→ (E x ∧ E y))) ∧ (∀ x y . E (x ·y)
← (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y))) ∧ (∀ x y z . x ·(y ·z) ∼= (x ·y)·z) ∧ (∀ y . I (Cod y) ∧
(Cod y)·y ∼= y) ∧ (∀ x . I (Dom x) ∧ x ·(Dom x) ∼= x) ). Note that the inclusion of strictness of Cod and Dom
is still missing.
6
6 Axiom Set III
In Axiom Set III the existence axiom E is simplified by taking advantage of the two new
Skolem functions dom and cod.
S iii: — Strictness: (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y) and
E iii: — Existence: E (x ·y) ← (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ E (cod y)) and
Aiii: — Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z and
C iii: — Codomain: E y → (I (cod y) ∧ (cod y)·y ∼= y) and
D iii: — Domain: E x → (I (dom x ) ∧ x ·(dom x ) ∼= x )
The obligatory consistency check is positive.
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
The left-to-right direction of existence axiom E iii is implied.
lemma E iiiImplied : E (x ·y) → (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ E (cod y))
by (metis (full-types) Aiii C iii D iii S iii)
Moreover, Axiom Set II is implied.
lemma S iiFromIII : (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y)
using S iii by blast
lemma E iiFromIII : E (x ·y) ← (E x ∧ E y ∧ (∃ z . z ·z ∼= z ∧ x ·z ∼= x ∧ z ·y ∼= y))
by (metis Aiii C iii D iii E iii S iii)
lemma AiiFromIII : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using Aiii by blast
lemma C iiFromIII : E y → (I (cod y) ∧ (cod y)·y ∼= y)
using C iii by auto
lemma D iiFromIII : E x → (I (dom x ) ∧ x ·(dom x ) ∼= x )
using D iii by auto
A side remark on the experiments: All proofs above and all proofs in the rest of this paper
have been obtained fully automatically with the Sledgehammer tool in Isabelle/HOL. This
tool interfaces to prominent first-order automated theorem provers such as CVC4 [8], Z3 [7],
E [13] and Spass [3]. Remotely, also provers such as Vampire [11], or the higher-order provers
Satallax [6] and LEO-II [2] can be reached. For example, to prove lemma E iiiFromII we
have called Sledgehammer on all postulated axioms of the theory: sledgehammer (S ii E ii Aii
C ii D ii). The provers then, via Sledgehammer, suggested to call trusted/verified tools in
Isabelle/HOL with the exactly required dependencies they detected. In lemma E iiiFromII,
for example, all axioms from Axiom Set II are required. With the provided dependency
information the trusted tools in Isabelle/HOL were then able to reconstruct the external
proofs on their own. This way we obtain a verified Isabelle/HOL document in which all the
proofs have nevertheless been contributed by automated theorem provers.
Axiom Set II also implies Axiom Set III. Hence, both theories are equivalent. The only
interesting case is lemma E iiiFromII, the other cases are trivial.
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lemma S iiiFromII : (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y)
using S ii by blast
lemma E iiiFromII : E (x ·y) ← (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ (E (cod y)))
by (metis C ii D ii E ii S ii)
lemma AiiiFromII : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using Aii by blast
lemma C iiiFromII : E y → (I (cod y) ∧ (cod y)·y ∼= y)
using C ii by auto
lemma D iiiFromII : E x → (I (dom x ) ∧ x ·(dom x ) ∼= x )
using D ii by auto
7 Axiom Set IV
Axiom Set IV simplifies the axioms C iii and D iii. However, as it turned out, these simplifi-
cations also require the existence axiom E iii to be strengthened into an equivalence.
S iv: — Strictness: (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y) and
E iv: — Existence: E (x ·y) ↔ (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ E (cod y)) and
Aiv: — Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z and
C iv: — Codomain: (cod y)·y ∼= y and
D iv: — Domain: x ·(dom x ) ∼= x
The obligatory consistency check is again positive.
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
The Axiom Set III is implied. The only interesting cases are lemmata C iiiFromIV and
D iiiFromIV. Note that the strengthened axiom E iv is used here.
lemma S iiiFromIV : (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y)
using S iv by blast
lemma E iiiFromIV : E (x ·y) ← (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ (E (cod y)))
using E iv by blast
lemma AiiiFromIV : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using Aiv by blast
lemma C iiiFromIV : E y → (I (cod y) ∧ (cod y)·y ∼= y)
by (metis C iv D iv E iv)
lemma D iiiFromIV : E x → (I (dom x ) ∧ x ·(dom x ) ∼= x )
by (metis C iv D iv E iv)
Vice versa, Axiom Set III implies Axiom Set IV. Hence, both theories are equivalent. The
interesting cases are lemmata E ivFromIII, C ivFromIII and D ivFromIII.
lemma S ivFromIII : (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y)
using S iii by blast
lemma E ivFromIII : E (x ·y) ↔ (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ E (cod y))
by (metis (full-types) Aiii C iii D iii E iii S iii)
lemma AivFromIII : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using Aiii by blast
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lemma C ivFromIII : (cod y)·y ∼= y
using C iii S iii by blast
lemma D ivFromIII : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x
using D iii S iii by blast
8 Axiom Set V
Axiom Set V has been proposed by Scott [15] in the 1970s. This set of axioms is equivalent
to the axiom set presented by Freyd and Scedrov in their textbook “Categories, Allegories”
[10] when encoded in free logic, corrected/adapted and further simplified. Their axiom set
is technically flawed when encoded in our given context. This issue has been detected by
automated theorem provers with the same technical infrastructure as employed so far. See
the subsequent section for more details. We have modified the axioms of [10] by replacing the
original Kleene equality ∼= in axiom S3 by the non-reflexive, existing identity ≃. Note that
the modified axiom S3 is equivalent to E iv; see the mutual proofs below.
S1 : — Strictness: E (dom x ) → E x and
S2 : — Strictness: E (cod y) → E y and
S3 : — Existence: E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y and
S4 : — Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z and
S5 : — Domain: x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
S6 : — Codomain: (cod y)·y ∼= y
The obligatory consistency check is again positive.
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
The Axiom Set IV is implied. The only interesting cases are lemmata S ivFromV and
E ivFromV.
lemma S ivFromV : (E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y)) ∧ (E (dom x ) → E x ) ∧ (E (cod y) → E y)
using S1 S2 S3 by blast
lemma E ivFromV : E (x ·y) ↔ (dom x ∼= cod y ∧ E (cod y))
using S3 by metis
lemma AivFromV : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using S4 by blast
lemma C ivFromV : (cod y)·y ∼= y
using S6 by blast
lemma D ivFromV : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x
using S5 by blast
Vice versa, Axiom Set IV implies Axiom Set V. Hence, both theories are equivalent.
lemma S1FromV : E (dom x ) → E x
using S iv by blast
lemma S2FromV : E (cod y) → E y
using S iv by blast
lemma S3FromV : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y
using E iv by metis
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lemma S4FromV : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using Aiv by blast
lemma S5FromV : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x
using D iv by blast
lemma S6FromV : (cod y)·y ∼= y
using C iv by blast
9 Axiom Sets VI and VII
The axiom set of Freyd and Scedrov from their textbook “Categories, Allegories” [10] becomes
inconsistent in our free logic setting if we assume non-existing objects of type i, respectively, if
we assume that the operations are non-total. Freyd and Scedrov employ a different notation
for dom x and cod x. They denote these operations by ✷x and x✷. Moreover, they employ
diagrammatic composition (f ·g) x ∼= g(f x ) (functional composition from left to right) instead
of the set-theoretic definition (f ·g) x ∼= f (g x ) (functional composition from right to left) used
so far.
We leave it to the reader to verify that their axiom system corresponds to the axiom system
given below modulo an appropriate conversion of notation.5 In Subsection 9.2 we will also
analyze their axiom system using their original notation.
A main difference in the system by Freyd and Scedrov to our Axiom Set V from above
concerns axiom S3. Namely, instead of the non-reflexive ≃, they use Kleene equality ∼=, cf.
definition 1.11 on page 3 of [10].6 The difference seems minor, but in our free logic setting
it has the effect to cause the mentioned constricted inconsistency issue. This could perhaps
be an oversight, or it could indicate that Freyd and Scedrov actually mean the Axiom Set
VIII below (where the variables in the axioms range over defined objects only). However, in
Axiom Set VIII we had to (re-)introduce explicit strictness conditions to ensure equivalence
to the Axiom Set V by Scott.
9.1 Axiom Set VI
A1 : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y and
A2a: cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x and
A2b: dom(cod y) ∼= cod y and
A3a: x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
A3b: (cod y)·y ∼= y and
A4a: dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y) and
A4b: cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y)) and
A5 : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
The obligatory consistency checks are again positive. But note that this only holds when we
use ≃ instead of ∼= in A1.
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
5A recipe for this translation is as follows: (i) replace all x ·y by y ·x, (ii) rename the variables to get them
again in alphabetical order, (iii) replace ϕ✷ by cod ϕ and ✷ϕ by dom ϕ, and finally (iv) replace cod y ∼= dom
x (resp. cod y ≃ dom x) by dom x ∼= cod y (resp. dom x ≃ cod y).
6Def. 1.11 in Freyd Scedrov: “The ordinary equality sign = [i.e., our ∼=] will be used in the symmetric sense,
to wit: if either side is defined then so is the other and they are equal. . . . ”
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lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
Axiom Set VI implies Axiom Set V.
lemma S1FromVI : E (dom x ) → E x
by (metis A1 A2a A3a)
lemma S2FromVI : E (cod y) → E y
using A1 A2b A3b by metis
lemma S3FromVI : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y
by (metis A1 )
lemma S4FromVI : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using A5 by blast
lemma S5FromVI : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x
using A3a by blast
lemma S6FromVI : (cod y)·y ∼= y
using A3b by blast
Note, too, that Axiom Set VI is redundant. For example, axioms A4a and A4b are implied
from the others. This kind of flaw in presenting axioms in our view is a more serious oversight.
The automated theorem provers can quickly reveal such redundancies.
lemma A4aRedundant : dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y)
using A1 A2a A3a A5 by metis
lemma A4bRedundant : cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y))
using A1 A2b A3b A5 by metis
Our attempts to further reduce the axioms set (A1 A2a A2b A3a A3b A5 ) were not successful.
Alternatively, we can e.g. keep A4a and A4b and show that axioms A2a and A2b are implied.
lemma A2aRedundant : cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x
using A1 A3a A3b A4a A4b by smt
lemma A2bRedundant : dom(cod y) ∼= cod y
using A1 A3a A3b A4a A4b by smt
Again, attempts to further reduce the set (A1 A3a A3b A4a A4b A5 ) were not successful.
Other reduced sets of axioms we identified in experiments are (A1 A2a A3a A3b A4b A5 )
and (A1 A2b A3a A3b A4a A5 ). Attempts to remove axioms A1, A3a, A3b, and A5 from
Axiom Set VI failed. Nitpick shows that they are independent.
However, when assuming strictness of dom and cod, the axioms A2a, A2b, A4a and A4b are
all implied. Hence, under this assumptions, the reasoning tools quickly identify (A1 A3a A3b
A5 ) as a minimal axiom set, which then exactly matches the Axiom Set V from above.7
Axiom Set V implies Axiom Set VI. Hence, both theories are equivalent.
lemma A1FromV : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y
using S3 by blast
lemma A2aFromV : cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x
by (metis S1 S2 S3 S5 )
lemma A2bFromV : dom(cod y) ∼= cod y
7This minimal set of axioms is also mentioned by Freyd in [9] and attributed to Martin Knopman. However,
the proof sketch presented there seems to fail when the adapted version of A1 (with ≃) is employed.
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using S1 S2 S3 S6 by metis
lemma A3aFromV : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x
using S5 by blast
lemma A3bFromV : (cod y)·y ∼= y
using S6 by blast
lemma A4aFromV : dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y)
by (metis S1 S3 S4 S5 S6 )
lemma A4bFromV : cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y))
by (metis S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 )
lemma A5FromV : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
using S4 by blast
9.2 Axiom Set VII
We now study the constricted inconsistency in Axiom Set VI when replacing ≃ in A1 by ∼=.
We call this Axiom Set VII. This set corresponds modulo representational transformation to
the axioms as presented by Freyd and Scedrov. Remember, however, that the free variables
are ranging here over all objects, defined or undefined. Below, when we study Axiom Set
VIII, we will restrict the variables to range only over existing objects.
A1 : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ∼= cod y and
A2a: cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x and
A2b: dom(cod y) ∼= cod y and
A3a: x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
A3b: (cod y)·y ∼= y and
A4a: dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y) and
A4b: cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y)) and
A5 : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
A model can still be constructed if we do not make assumptions about non-existing objects.
In fact, the model presented by Nitpick consists of a single, existing morphism.
lemma True
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops — Nitpick finds a
model
However, one can see directly that axiom A1 is problematic as written: If x and y are un-
defined, then (presumably) dom x and cod y are undefined as well, and by the definition of
Kleene equality, dom x ∼= cod y. A1 stipulates that x ·y should be defined in this case, which
appears unintended.
We shall see that the consequences of this version of the axiom are even stronger. It implies
that all objects are defined, that is, composition (as well as dom and cod) become total
operations. The theory described by these axioms “collapses” to the theory of monoids. (If
all objects are defined, then one can conclude from A1 that dom x ∼= dom y (resp. dom x ∼=
cod y and cod x ∼= cod y), and according to 1.14 of [10], the category reduces to a monoid
provided that it is not empty.)
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick does *not* find a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = none] oops
In fact, the automated theorem provers quickly prove falsity when assuming a non-existing
object of type i. The provers identify the axioms A1, A2a and A3a to cause the problem
under this assumption.
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lemma InconsistencyAutomaticVII : (∃ x . ¬(E x )) → False
by (metis A1 A2a A3a)
Hence, all morphisms must be defined in theory of Axiom Set VII, or in other words, all
operations must be total.
lemma ∀ x . E x using InconsistencyAutomaticVII by auto
The constricted inconsistency proof can be turned into an interactive mathematical argument:
lemma InconsistencyInteractiveVII :
assumes NEx : ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows False
proof −
— Let a be an undefined object
obtain a where 1 : ¬(E a) using NEx by auto
— We instantiate axiom A3a with a.
have 2 : a·(dom a) ∼= a using A3a by blast
— By unfolding the definition of ∼= we get from 1 that a·(dom a) is not defined. This is easy to see,
since if a·(dom a) were defined, we also had that a is defined, which is not the case by assumption.
have 3 : ¬(E (a·(dom a))) using 1 2 by metis
— We instantiate axiom A1 with a and dom a.
have 4 : E (a·(dom a)) ↔ dom a ∼= cod(dom a) using A1 by blast
— We instantiate axiom A2a with a.
have 5 : cod(dom a) ∼= dom a using A2a by blast
— We use 5 (and symmetry and transitivity of ∼=) to rewrite the right-hand of the equivalence 4
into dom a ∼= dom a.
have 6 : E (a·(dom a)) ↔ dom a ∼= dom a using 4 5 by auto
— By reflexivity of ∼= we get that a·(dom a) must be defined.
have 7 : E (a·(dom a)) using 6 by blast
— We have shown in 7 that a·(dom a) is defined, and in 3 that it is undefined. Contradiction.
then show ?thesis using 7 3 by blast
qed
We present the constricted inconsistency argument once again, but this time in the original
notation of Freyd and Scedrov.
consts
source:: i⇒i (✷- [108 ] 109 )
target :: i⇒i (-✷ [110 ] 111 )
compositionF :: i⇒i⇒i (infix · 110 )
A1 : E (x·y) ↔ (x✷ ∼= ✷y) and
A2a: ((✷x )✷) ∼= ✷x and
A2b: ✷(x✷) ∼= ✷x and
A3a: (✷x )·x ∼= x and
A3b: x·(x✷) ∼= x and
A4a: ✷(x·y) ∼= ✷(x·(✷y)) and
A4b: (x·y)✷ ∼= ((x✷)·y)✷ and
A5 : x·(y·z ) ∼= (x·y)·z
Again, the automated theorem provers via Sledgehammer find the constricted inconsistency
very quickly and they identify the exact dependencies.
lemma InconsistencyAutomatic: (∃ x . ¬(E x )) → False
by (metis A1 A2a A3a)
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The following alternative interactive proof is slightly shorter than the one presented above.
lemma InconsistencyInteractive: assumes NEx : ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows False
proof −
— Let a be an undefined object
obtain a where 1 : ¬(E a) using assms by auto
— We instantiate axiom A3a with a.
have 2 : (✷a)·a ∼= a using A3a by blast
— By unfolding the definition of ∼= we get from 1 that (✷a)·a is not defined. This is easy to see,
since if (✷a)·a were defined, we also had that a is defined, which is not the case by assumption.
have 3 : ¬(E ((✷a)·a)) using 1 2 by metis
— We instantiate axiom A1 with ✷a and a.
have 4 : E ((✷a)·a) ↔ (✷a)✷ ∼= ✷a using A1 by blast
— We instantiate axiom A2a with a.
have 5 : (✷a)✷ ∼= ✷a using A2a by blast
— From 4 and 5 we obtain (E ((✷a)·a)) by propositional logic.
have 6 : E ((✷a)·a) using 4 5 by blast
— We have ¬(E ((✷a)·a)) and E ((✷a)·a), hence Falsity.
then show ?thesis using 6 3 by blast
qed
Obviously Axiom Set VII is also redundant, and we have previously reported on respective
redundancies [1]. However, this was before the discovery of the above constricted inconsistency
issue, which tells us that the system (in our setting) can even be reduced to A1, A2a and
A3a (when we additionally assume NEx ).
10 Axiom Set VIII
We study the axiom system by Freyd and Scedrov once again. However, this time we restrict
the free variables in their system to range over existing objects only. By employing the free
logic universal quantifier ∀ we thus modify Axiom Set VII as follows:
B1 : ∀ x .∀ y. E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ∼= cod y and
B2a: ∀ x . cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x and
B2b: ∀ y. dom(cod y) ∼= cod y and
B3a: ∀ x . x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
B3b: ∀ y. (cod y)·y ∼= y and
B4a: ∀ x .∀ y. dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y) and
B4b: ∀ x .∀ y. cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y)) and
B5 : ∀ x .∀ y.∀ z . x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
Now, the two consistency checks succeed.
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
However, this axiom set is obviously weaker than our Axiom Set V. In fact, none of the
V -axioms are implied:
lemma S1 : E (dom x ) → E x — Nitpick finds a countermodel
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nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 ] oops
lemma S2 : E (cod y) → E y — Nitpick finds a countermodel
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 ] oops
lemma S3 : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y — Nitpick finds a countermodel
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 ] oops
lemma S4 : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z — Nitpick finds a countermodel
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 ] oops
lemma S5 : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x — Nitpick finds a countermodel
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 ] oops
lemma S6 : (cod y)·y ∼= y — Nitpick finds a countermodel
nitpick [user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 ] oops
The situation changes when we explicitly postulate strictness of dom, cod and ·. We thus
obtain our Axiom Set VIII:
B0a: E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y) and
B0b: E (dom x ) → E x and
B0c: E (cod x ) → E x and
B1 : ∀ x .∀ y. E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ∼= cod y and
B2a: ∀ x . cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x and
B2b: ∀ y. dom(cod y) ∼= cod y and
B3a: ∀ x . x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
B3b: ∀ y. (cod y)·y ∼= y and
B4a: ∀ x .∀ y. dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y) and
B4b: ∀ x .∀ y. cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y)) and
B5 : ∀ x .∀ y.∀ z . x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
Again, the two consistency checks succeed
lemma True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes ∃ x . ¬(E x ) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
lemma assumes (∃ x . ¬(E x )) ∧ (∃ x . (E x )) shows True — Nitpick finds a model
nitpick [satisfy, user-axioms , show-all , format = 2 , expect = genuine] oops
Now Axiom Set V is implied.
lemma S1FromVIII : E (dom x ) → E x using B0b by blast
lemma S2FromVIII : E (cod y) → E y using B0c by blast
lemma S3FromVIII : E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y by (metis B0a B0b B0c B1 B3a)
lemma S4FromVIII : x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z by (meson B0a B5 )
lemma S5FromVIII : x ·(dom x ) ∼= x using B0a B3a by blast
lemma S6FromVIII : (cod y)·y ∼= y using B0a B3b by blast
Vive versa, Axiom Set V implies Axiom Set VIII. Hence, both theories are equivalent.
S1 : — Strictness: E (dom x ) → E x and
S2 : — Strictness: E (cod y) → E y and
S3 : — Existence: E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ≃ cod y and
S4 : — Associativity: x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z and
S5 : — Domain: x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
S6 : — Codomain: (cod y)·y ∼= y
lemma B0a: E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y) using S1 S2 S3 by blast
lemma B0b: E (dom x ) → E x using S1 by blast
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lemma B0c: E (cod x ) → E x using S2 by blast
lemma B1 : ∀ x .∀ y. E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ∼= cod y by (metis S3 S5 )
lemma B2a: ∀ x . cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x by (metis S3 S5 )
lemma B2b: ∀ y. dom(cod y) ∼= cod y by (metis S3 S6 )
lemma B3a: ∀ x . x ·(dom x ) ∼= x using S5 by auto
lemma B3b: ∀ y. (cod y)·y ∼= y using S6 by blast
lemma B4a: ∀ x .∀ y. dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y) by (metis S1 S3 S4 S5 )
lemma B4b: ∀ x .∀ y. cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y)) by (metis S2 S3 S4 S6 )
lemma B5 : ∀ x .∀ y.∀ z . x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z using S4 by blast
Axiom Set VIII is redundant (as expected from previous observations). The theorem provers
quickly confirm that axioms B2a, B2b, B4a, B4b are implied.
B0a: E (x ·y) → (E x ∧ E y) and
B0b: E (dom x ) → E x and
B0c: E (cod x ) → E x and
B1 : ∀ x .∀ y. E (x ·y) ↔ dom x ∼= cod y and
B3a: ∀ x . x ·(dom x ) ∼= x and
B3b: ∀ y. (cod y)·y ∼= y and
B5 : ∀ x .∀ y.∀ z . x ·(y·z ) ∼= (x ·y)·z
lemma B2aRedundant : ∀ x . cod(dom x ) ∼= dom x by (metis B0a B1 B3a)
lemma B2bRedundant : ∀ y. dom(cod y) ∼= cod y by (metis B0a B1 B3b)
lemma B4aRedundant : ∀ x .∀ y. dom(x ·y) ∼= dom((dom x )·y) by (metis B0a B0b B1 B3a B5 )
lemma B4bRedundant : ∀ x .∀ y. cod(x ·y) ∼= cod(x ·(cod y)) by (metis B0a B0c B1 B3b B5 )
Again, note the relation and similarity of the reduced Axiom Set VIII to Axiom Set V by
Scott, which we prefer, since it avoids a mixed use of free and bound variables in the encoding
and since it is smaller.
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